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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
CONTRACTS - SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - CREATION
OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
Butler v. Attwood, 369 F.2d 811 (6th Cit. 1966).
Although a corporate shareholder is normally free to buy or
sell shares as he wishes,' certain restrictions on the transfer of shares
may be imposed by charter or by shareholder agreements.2 In But-
ler v. Attwood3 plaintiff Butler sought a court decree requiring the
defendants - Attwood, the original buyer, and the Finzels, the
original sellers - to transfer to him certain corporate shares which
had become the subject of a buy-and-sell agreement between Att-
wood and the Finzels (hereinafter referred to as the Attwood-Finzel
contract). Plaintiff Butler based his claim upon an antecedent con-
tract (hereinafter referred to as the Butler-Attwood contract) he
had negotiated with the buyer, Attwood, which entitled the plain-
tiff to purchase one half of any stock in the corporation that be-
came available for purchase by Attwood The federal district court
held that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance against
the buyer since the latter had breached his earlier agreement with
the plaintiff when he refused to sell the shares to him, but the court
denied such relief against the sellers, the Finzels, because the buyer
had not entered into the Attwood-Finzel contract as an agent or
fiduciary of the plaintiff.'
The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the relief granted by the
district court was "worthless" to him because the buyer, Attwood,
and the sellers had failed to dose the sale of the shares to the buyer.
In remanding, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff was entitled
to specific performance against both the buyer and the sellers!
'Andrews, The Stockholders Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78
HAIv. L. REV. 505 (1965).
2 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 336 (rev. ed. 1947).
8 369 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1966).
4 The agreement provided that "any future purchases of stock shall be made on a
50-50 basis between the two parties and that at some future time an agreement for all
contingencies will be drawn between the parties." Id. at 813.
5 Id. at 812. The lower court granted specific performance of the Butler-Attwood
contract because the stock was unique and not available on the marker. Butler v. Art-
wood, Civil No. 25165, E.D. Mich., Aug. 2, 1965. In recent years the courts have in-
creased the availability of specific performance of contracts other than those for the sale
of land. Generally, courts have granted specific performance of a contract for the sale
of any stock which is unique.' See Baltimore Realty Corp. v. Alman, 282 App. Div.
714, 122 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1953); Kurth v. Hauser, 262 Wis. 325, 55 N.W.2d 367
(1952); Van Hecke, Changing Emphasis in Specific Performance, 40 N.C.L REV. 1
(1961); Comment, 51 Mici. L REV. 408 (1953).
6 369 F.2d at 821.
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The court of appeals in Butler decided that the lower court's
finding that the buyer had not entered into the Attwood-Finzel
contract as a fiduciary of the plaintiff was a conclusion of law in-
consistent with the findings of fact.' Having found that a fiduciary
relationship existed between the plaintiff and the buyer, the appel-
late court manifested its desire to be equitable by creating a con-
structuve trust.' It was reasoned that Attwood obtained a vested
right to acquire the sellers' shares and to the extent of one half of
these shares held such right as a constructive trustee for the plain-
tiff.9 In addition, the court held that in order to fulfill the con-
structive trust, there was no impediment in employing as a remedial
device a decree which directed the carrying out of the Attwood-
Finzel contract, particularly since the sellers knew of the plaintiff's
rights acquired under the Butler-Attwood contract."0
The court of appeals overruled the district court on the issue
of whether the buyer entered into the Attwood-Finzel contract as a
fiduciary of the plaintiff.1 The term fiduciary in its broadest mean-
ing includes both technical fiduciary relationships and those infor-
mal relations which exist whenever one person trusts and relies
upon another.'
The lower court found that the conduct of the parties demon-
strated that the Butler-Attwood agreement simply required that one
party communicate the existence of opportunities to purchase stock
in the corporation to the other party who would then be privileged
to purchase one half of the amount offered for sale. 8 The lower
court also found that the conduct of the parties demonstrated that
neither of them was required to purchase the stock with a resale of
71d. at 819.
8Ibid. A constructive trust is a remedial device of a court of equity, arising when
a person in a fiduciary relation acquires or retains property in violaton of his fiduciary
duty. 4 SCOTT, TRUsTS § 499, at 3225 (2d ed. 1956). The fiduciary under these cir-
cumstances holds the property as a constructive trustee and is subject to an equitable
duty to convey the property to the beneficiary of the trust on the ground that the trus-
tee would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it. Id. at 462.1, at 3104.
9 369 F.2d at 818. The court stated that the right of the buyer to purchase and
the obligation of the sellers to sell the shares created a res upon which to impose a trust
for the benefit of the plaintiff. Ibid.
10 Ibid.
"1 Ibid.
12 E.g., trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, agent-principal, and attorney-cient. See
Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 138 Tem. 565, 571, 160 S.W.2d 509, 512(1942); Cartwright v. Minton, 318 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). A fiduciary is
under a duty to act for the benefit of the other party as to matters within the scope of
the relationship. 1 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2.5, at 38.
18 369 F.2d at 815.
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one half to the other party, concluding from these facts that the
buyer did not enter into the Attwood-Finzel contract as an agent
or fiduciary of the plaintiff.'
The Sixth Circuit, in reaching a different conclusion, 5 reasoned
that the buyer entered into the Finzel-Attwood contract as an agent,
with a corresponding fiduciary duty, 6 for the plaintiff. When
given authority to acquire property for his principal, the agent vio-
lates his fiduciary duty if he either purchases such property for his
own account' or rescinds or modifies the terms of the sale after its
completion.'" Moreover, a third party is subject to liability to the
principal if he intentionally assists an agent in violating the duty
to his principal.' 9
In the instant case the buyer, acting as the plaintiff's agent, had
no authority to rescind the Attwood-Finzel contract with the sellers.
The buyer thus held the right to purchase one half of the shares
as a constuctive trustee for the plaintiff since the buyer, by rescind-
ing the Attwood-Finzel agreement, violated his fiduciary duty. In
addition, the sellers were liable to the plaintiff for assisting the
buyer in breaching his fiduciary duty. This analysis would seem to
verified by the fact that the court of appeals relied on an agency
case, Harmer v. King," to support its view that the plaintiff ob-
tained an enforceable interest in the Attwood-Finzel contract.2 '
There is some question as to whether the Sixth Circuit was cor-
rect in its analysis that the buyer entered into the Attwood-Finzel
'4 Id. at 812.
15Id. at 819.
16 It is well established that an agent, a fiduciary with respect to matters within the
scope of his agency, is under a duty to act exclusively for his principal's interest. Sim
v. Edenborn, 242 U.S. 131 (1916); Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir.
1951); Elco Shoe Mfrs. v. Sisk, 260 N.Y. 100, 183 N.E. 191 (1932); REsTATE:MENT
(SECOND), AGENcY § 13 (1958).
17 The agent will thus be considered a constructive trustee. See Quinn v. Phipps,
93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927); Sentell v. Richardson, 211 Ila. 288, 29 So. 2d 852
(1947); Whitten v. Wright, 206 Minn. 450, 289 N.W. 509 (1939).
sHuish v. Lop1ez, 70 Ariz. 201, 207, 218 P.2d 727, 731 (1950) (agent has no
power to rescind); Gallagher v. California Pac. Title & Trust Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 482,
492, 57 P.2d 195, 200 (Dist. Ct App. 1936) (agent has no power to vary or cancel
contract); Quirk v. Raymond Heard, Inc., 222 La. 46, 54, 62 So. 2d 96, 98-99 (1952)
(agent has no power to abrogate or modify contract); Curtis v. Zurich Gen. Acc. &
tiab. Co., 108 Mont. 275, 285, 89 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1939) (agent has no power to
rescind contract); REsTATEmENT (SEcOND), AGENCY § 66 (1958).
19 Io re Browning's Estate, 177 Misc. 328, 30 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Surr. Ct. 1941). See
4 ScoTr, op. cit. supra note 8, § 506, at 3247; Scott, The FiduciarY Principle, 37 CALIF.
L. REV. 539, 554 (1949); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), AGENCY § 312 (1958).
20 [1933) 1 Ch. 65 (C.A.).
21 Butler v. Attwood, 369 F.2d 811, 820 (6th Cit. 1966).
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contract as an agent of the plaintiff. The district court had found
that the conduct of the parties demonstrated that the buyer was not
intended by the parties' agreement or acts to be an agent of the
plaintiff.22 It thus seems doubtful that the court of appeals was
correct, at least on the basis of agency principles.
The impact of the Sixth Circuit's decision will be that courts,
in order to achieve justice, will find a fiduciary or agency relation-
ship which the parties never intended; this may cause injustice if
the "principal" himself decides not to purchase the shares. In the
instant case, even if the plaintiff had not wanted to buy the shares,
he would have been obligated to, since he, as principal, would be
liable to the sellers upon the Attwood-Finzel contract made by his
agent, the buyer, acting within the scope of authority.2
Another approach the Sixth Circuit could have adopted would
be to interpret the Butler-Attwood contract as a traditional bilateral
conditional option contract. 4 Various types of option contracts
exist in which the optionee can elect between alternatives.2" Under
such a contract, the optionee has a conditional right to performance
with a power to make that right unconditional by fulfilling at his
discretion, the conditions of the contract.2"
By analogy, in conditional land option contracts the prevailing
view is that if the option is based on valuable consideration, the
option contract creates an equitable property interest for the op-
tionee.27 Under this view the optionee is vested with the right to
22 Bufler v. Attwood, Civ. No. 25165, ED. Mich., Aug. 2, 1965. On appeal the
buyer argued that the plaintiff never considered the buyer his agent because after the
plaintiff became aware of the Attwood-Finzel contract, the plaintiff chose not to con-
tact his supposed "agent" but rather to contact his attorney who communicated to the
sellers the plaintiff's desire to buy the shares. See Brief for Defendants-Appellees, p.
19, Butler v. Attwood, 369 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1966).
2 3 For a discussion of this liability, see Weeks v. United States, 245 U.S. 618 (1918);
Dobson Coal Co. v. Delano, 266 Pa. 560, 109 Atl. 676 (1920).
2 4 This contract between the plaintiff and the buyer could have been interpreted
to mean that "The plaintiff promises to sell fifty percent of the stock if he gets any and
if the buyer gives the plaintiff notice within a reasonable time in exchange for the
buyer's identical promise to sell fifty percent of the stock if he gets any and if the plain-
tiff gives the buyer notice within a reasonable time."
2 5 Corbin, Option Contracts, 23 YALE L.J. 641 (1914).
26 1A CORBiN, CoNTRAcrs § 210, at 566-68 (1963); 1 WIISTON, CoNTRAcrs
§ 61B, at 199-200 (3d ed. 1957).
27 See, e.g., House v. Jackson, 24 Ore. 89, 32 Pac. 1027 (1893); Kerr v. Day, 14
Pa. 112 (1850); Telford v. Frost, 76 Wis. 172, 44 N.W. 835 (1890). Contra, Rich-
ardson v. Hardwick, 106 U.S. 252, 254 (1882); Bostwick v. Hess, 80 IIl. 138 (1875);
Gustin v. Union School-Dist., 94 Mich. 502, 54 N.W. 156 (1893). Professor Corbin
asserts that an option unsupported by consideration gives the optionee no interest in
the land because the option then becomes a mere offer to sell. However, where the
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acquire an interest in the land, which when exercised by giving no-
tice, entitles him to specific performance against the optionor" or
a subsequent purchaser with notice of the irrevocable option 9
In the instant case, if the Sixth Circuit had interpreted the
Buder-Attwood contract as a bilateral conditional option contract,
the court could have found that the plaintiff had an enforceable
interest assertible against the sellers. Similarly, the court could
have reasoned that the antecedent contract was a bilateral option
contract to convey stock with an express condition that notice had to
be given before conveyance could be required. Since the plaintiff-
optionee wanted the stock, he gave notice to the buyer-optionor.3 0
Notice by the optionee was not an acceptance of an offer but was
a fulfillment of a condition precedent to the optionor's liability on
the Buder-Attwood contract." Following the reasoning of the
land option contract cases," the option contract vested in the op-
tionee the right to acquire a one half interest in the stock contract
between the optionor and the sellers, which entitled him, upon his
giving notice of intent to purchase, to specific performance against
the optionor and the sellers.
Although the Sixth Circuit granted relief to the plaintiff against
the sellers, it did so by finding a fiduciary relationship which was
intended by neither the plaintiff nor the buyer. A better ap-
proach for a court to take when interpreting similar contracts is to
treat them as conditional option contracts, thus taking into account
the intention of the parties. Moreover, a court under the condi-
tional option approach will be prevented from finding that a per-
son must purchase stock he never intended to acquire. An individ-
option is a conditional contract to convey, Corbin feels that the optionee should be
held to have an interest in the land. Corbin, supra note 25, at 660.
28 The optionee has a contractual right enforceable against the optionor. See, e.g.,
Guyer v. Warren, 175 IML 328, 51 N.E. 580 (1898); O'Brien v. Roland, 166 Mass.
481, 44 N.E. 502 (1896); Hawralty v. Warren, 18 N.J. Eq. 124 (Ch. 1866); Watkins
v. Robertson, 105 Va. 269, 54 S.F. 33 (1906).
33 The optionee has a contractual right enforceable against a third party. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Bangham, 156 Cal. 359, 104 Pac. 689 (1909); Tucker v. Connors, 342 Mass.
376, 173 NE.2d 619 (1961); Barrett v. McAllister, 33 W. Va. 738, 11 S.E. 220
(1890); Sizer v. Clark, 116 Wis. 534,93 N.W. 539 (1903); 1 WILLISTON, op. Cit. supra
note 26, § 61C, at 203 n.20. Contra, Vain Turpentine & Cattle Co. v. Allen, 38 Ga.
App. 408, 144 S.E. 47 (1928). One eminent authority has stated that the reason the
option can be enforced against such an assignee is that the optionee has a contract right
which ought to be respected by third persons. 1A CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 26, §
272, at 581-82.
30 Butler v. Attwood, 369 F.2d 811, 812 (6th Cir. 1966).
81 Corbin, supra note 25, at 650.
32 For a discussion of the conditional land option contract cases, see notes 27-28
supra and accompanying text.
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